Cloud federation is an emergent cloud-computing paradigm that allows services from different cloud systems to be aggregated in a single pool. To support secure data sharing in a cloud federation, anonymization services that obfuscate sensitive datasets under differential privacy have been recently proposed. However, by outsourcing data protection to the cloud, data owners lose control over their data, raising privacy concerns. This is even more compelling in multi-query scenarios in which maintaining privacy amounts to controlling the allocation of the so-called privacy budget.
maintaining privacy amounts to controlling the allocation of the so-called privacy budget.
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based approach that enables data owners to control the anonymization process and that enhances the security of the services. Our approach relies on blockchain to validate the usage of the privacy budget and adaptively change its allocation through smart contracts, depending on the privacy requirements provided by data owners. Prototype implementation with the Hyperledger permissioned blockchain validates our approach with respect to privacy guarantee and practicality.
Cloud federation builds up interconnectivity and cooperation among already-deployed clouds, enabling organizations to achieve various business goals, such as controlled sharing of data and services and optimization of computing resource usage. [1] [2] [3] To support secure sharing of federated data, anonymization services have been proposed as a building component of federation-as-a-service (FaaS), 3, 4 a recent cloud federation solution. This component implements differential privacy to obfuscate the result of statistical queries towards sensitive datasets, 5 enabling its privacy-preserving sharing. Offering this service in the context of a cloud federation has benefits-access to multiple data sources and different service providers-but raises significant challenges for privacy management, such as sensitive datasets from multiple owners (each of whom has different privacy requirements), loose control on data, and untrusted anonymization services.
Traditional solutions for privacy management cannot be applied as-is in the context of cloud federation. Firstly, typical management of privacy and data-utility requirements must be extended to support multiple datasets and data owners. 6 Secondly, to protect anonymized data from degradation of privacy protection, recent approaches verify the privacy budget, which determines the amount of noise produced in the obfuscation process, and stop data sharing as soon as the budget is used up. 7 However, stopping data sharing must be avoided as much as possible to not hamper the business goals of the federation. Most importantly, due to the lack of trust among cloud federation members, anonymization services themselves cannot offer adequate guarantees for controlling and tracing the privacy budget; for example, they will end up being the single point of attack to make multi-query de-anonymization attacks possible.
Realizing a trustworthy decentralized management of the privacy budgets is then of paramount importance to ensure privacy protection of sensitive datasets and, most of all, to enhance assurances on the anonymization services. To this aim, we introduce a new solution based on blockchain, an innovative technology that, among other fascinating properties of data integrity, ensures full decentralized control of data and code execution.
In the following sections, we first introduce a motivating example to better illustrate the limitations of existing approaches and then discuss the research challenges addressed in the paper.
MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
Assume that a dataset containing employees' absence information is available (from multiple owners) for the sharing process. A data requestor sends a statistical data request (such as a mean query) and receives obfuscated query results by the anonymization services deployed in the cloud federation. The controls on how datasets are integrated and accessed are out of scope, so our focus is on the privacy-protection mechanism employed to anonymize the datasets.
The dataset, shown in Table 1 , contains privacy-sensitive information, such as salary and number of absences, and the data owner wants to prevent the leakage of the sensitive information. To this aim, a state-of-the-art anonymization service based on differential privacy 5 is used. Intuitively, it relies on an ε parameter, setting the privacy budget of a given dataset. Based on the ε, it generates randomized noise to the query result. 
Privacy Requirements
Let us assume data queries about the mean of employees' salary. Data owners can set ε according to their privacy requirements, such as 0.1 or 0.5 for, respectively, stronger and weaker privacy protection that means different noise levels on obfuscated results. Note that the value setting of the privacy budget ε can be presented to the user using a Likert scale that ranges from "strong protection" (ε = 0.1) to "weak protection" (ε = 0.5) with "medium protection" (ε = 0.25) as the neutral (default) option. Therefore, users select the desired protection strength rather than setting numeric values. The corresponding data loss due to the differential obfuscation can be visualized to users under each protection option to help users trade off privacy protection and data utility. Notably, developing a rigorous method for choosing an optimal ε in practice and designing an effective user interface for the privacy and data-utility trade-offs are open research areas and are out of the scope of this paper. 
Privacy Degradation
Differential privacy suffers from privacy degradation as the number of queries increases. Sharing a single query result guarantees the chosen privacy level (0.1 or 0.5 in this example), making it difficult to determine what the actual average salary is. However, if we combine multiple obfuscated results (each of the lines in the figure) , the privacy level degrades by cumulating ε over queries.
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For instance, executing 20 queries indicates a 20ε-differential privacy. This can be visualized in Figure 1 as the sum distance between the points on the dotted line with the actual one tending to equalize, hence revealing the actual value. Furthermore, if more query types are allowed-that is, data requestors send not only mean queries but also max, min, and quartile queries-the data requestors can learn much more information by sending queries continuously. A few studies have been investigating adaptive budget allocation strategies, 8 which inspire us on the design of our mechanism to save budget consumption. Additionally, as the budget may be consumed by multiple privacy services and refer to multiple data owners, the budget management cannot be entrusted to a single anonymization service. Instead, it requires adequate integrity and accountability guarantees such that all involved parties can rely on it.
PROPOSED APPROACH
In this paper, we propose a blockchain-based approach for privacy-preserving data sharing in a cloud federation. It allows data owners to control the anonymization process, such as defining their own privacy requirements, tracing the data-sharing activities, and enjoying secure services supported by the outsourced anonymization services. The main contributions of this paper are:
• A blockchain-based data-sharing approach to store, verify, and adaptively allocate privacy budget consumptions through autonomous smart contracts according to data owner privacy and data-utility requirements; • A high-level system architecture enabling the integration of any data anonymization service with any smart contract blockchain solution; and • Implementation and evaluation by means of the Hyperledger Fabric blockchain, as well as discussion on privacy and data-utility enhancements.
PRELIMINARIES Differential Privacy
Differential privacy is proposed as a privacy technique for protecting individual records of statistical databases. 5 This is usually achieved by designing a mechanism that adds randomized noise to the query output, so that an adversary is not able to determine whether a targeted record is included in the database or not, no matter what side information the adversary might have.
To present our approach, we first present the key concept and implementation mechanism of differential privacy. More details are available in the differential-privacy paper by Dwork. 
A popular technique that satisfies Definition 1 is the Laplace mechanism.
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Definition 2 (implementing ε-differential privacy with the Laplace mechanism)
Given any query q, the Laplace mechanism is q(D) + y where y is a random variable drawn from the Laplace distribution with scale parameter b = Sq/ε, where Sq represents the l1-norm sensitivity 5 of the query q and location parameter μ = 0.
The variable y expresses how much noise should be added to the query outcome. The smaller the ε or the greater the Sq, the greater the noise generated for achieving ε-differential privacy. We use Lap(ε) to denote the randomized noise generated by the Laplace mechanism.
An important property of differential privacy is the composition property, which shows how privacy degrades linearly when the number of queries on the same database increases.
Lemma 1 (composition)
If M1 is ε1-differentially private and M2 is ε2-differentially private-let M be another mechanism that executes M1 and M2 independently on a database-M is (ε1 + ε2)-differentially private. 5 
Blockchain and Smart Contracts
Blockchain is a novel technology that recently came to prominence when used as a public ledger for the Bitcoin cryptocurrency. It consists of consecutive chained blocks, replicated and stored by the nodes of a peer-to-peer network. Blocks are created in a decentralized fashion by means of a consensus algorithm, which can range from an expensive proof-of-work mechanism (such as Bitcoin's) to a lightweight Byzantine consensus algorithm (such as Hyperledger's). The use of consensus algorithms enables several data integrity-related properties in blockchain, such as distributed control of the data on the chain, non-repudiation, and persistency of transactions.
In contrast to Bitcoin, new types of blockchains are featuring smart contracts-that is, programs deployed and autonomously executed on the blockchain. Being part of the blockchain makes contracts and their executions immutable and irreversible. The state-of-the-art smart-contract blockchains are Ethereum and Hyperledger. Our implementation relies on the latter due to its performance and flexible architecture.
BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DATA SHARING
The objective of our blockchain-based data-sharing approach is to allow data owners to control anonymization processes, as well as to guarantee chosen privacy levels when using third-party anonymization services (especially to protect against multi-query attacks). Secure management of the privacy budget is indeed the key to ensure privacy.
The Approach
Our approach utilizes blockchain smart contracts to store, verify, and adaptively allocate privacy budget consumptions depending on the data owner's privacy and data-utility requirements. It relies on the two phases below.
At the Setup phase, data owners provide their privacy and data-utility requirements, which are then stored in the smart contract. The privacy requirement is represented by the privacy budget ε0, which represents the maximum amount of budget allowed for sharing data. The data-utility requirement is represented by a numerical variable, denoted by u ∈ R≥0, representing the maximum amount of noise allowed on the actual query result, thus maintaining adequate data utility.
At the Runtime phase, data queries are managed and return-when allowed by the privacy budget and requirements-anonymized results. Indeed, our approach M consists of an unbounded sequence of mechanisms M1, M2, ···, where Mi operates when the i-th query is received. Figure 2 illustrates the activities involved in each mechanism Mi. Logically, it can be decomposed into three main test activities (the diamond boxes in the figure): query matching, utility-based approximation, and budget verification. The activity flow is reported in the figure and relies on data and computation offered by a smart contract. 
Query matching
This activity aims at determining whether a newly received query has been executed before. A smart contract checks the sharing history stored on the blockchain. Formally, the sharing history amounts to the following tuple where DsetId is a reference to a dataset (or a column of it), while εr is the remaining associated privacy budget. The following list of tuples forms the sharing history. Each tuple (qry1, res1) has as first element the function type of the query-sum, average, max, or min-and as second the corresponding previously released result. Thus, resi is just the latest released results for each query type i-lightweight information whose limited size makes it suitable for blockchain storage.
The query matching compares a newly received query qry on the dataset referred by DsetId with the corresponding history. The query is denoted by the tuple (DsetId, qry, ε) , where the parameter ε denotes the requested budget for executing the query. The value of ε can be provided by the data consumer or pre-defined as a fixed value by anonymization services. Without loss of generality, we assume function types fixed and comparable by names; additional comparison parameters can be set, as well. Namely, given a DsetId, the test is passed when qry is equal to a qryi part of the history. Notably, to keep queries private to all the members who are part of the blockchain, the history data can be stored as hashed. Then the comparison will be on hash texts.
Utility-based approximation
This test aims at checking whether a previously released result can approximate the result to return for the current query. The test pseudocode is shown in Algorithm 1. First, it checks whether the remaining budget is enough for executing the test (Line 1). If yes, it produces an obfuscated version of the old result resold using a very small amount (σ) of the privacy budget (Line 2). Otherwise, it returns false (Line 11), stating that the approximation test failed. The computed obfuscated result is compared by a smart contract with the actual one with respect to the threshold u (Line 3). If the approximation test passes, the new obfuscated result is set as the last returned result of such a query (Line 4), the budget is updated accordingly (Line 5), and the approximated result is returned (Line 6). Otherwise, only the budget is updated (Lines 7 and 8) to keep tracking that σ was consumed by the approximation test.
When this approximation test succeeds and resold is used, the consumed budget σ is significantly less than that (requested budget ε) used for returning the actual res. The obfuscation added to resold aims at adding randomness to the utility test. This permits dealing with the fact that adversaries may know how the test works and attempt to gain knowledge about the actual result res from the test result. ε r = ε r − σ Updating budget in blockchain. 9:
return false. 10: else 11:
return false.
Algorithm 1. Utility-based approximation pseudocode.
Budget verification
The budget verification test is triggered if there has been no same query executed (the querymatching test failed) or if the query result cannot be approximated (the approximation test failed). Thus, a new result has to be computed, as long as the remaining privacy budget allows.
This test is carried out on a smart contract that, given a query tuple (DsetId, qry, ε), compares the remaining budget εr of the dataset DsetId with the requested budget ε. If the test succeeds, the anonymization service generates randomized noise under differential privacy to add to the actual query result consuming the requested budget. Otherwise, the query is rejected because it would violate the defined privacy requirement.
This test ensures the satisfaction of pre-defined privacy requirement ε0 as it makes sure the consumed budget does not exceed ε0. The mechanism updates the remaining budget, the query function type (if it was not been stored before), and the generated new result in the blockchain.
To summarize our approach, the privacy-budget allocation strategy depends on the three tests proposed in the data-sharing mechanism: query matching, approximation, and budget verification. More specifically, these tests aim to save privacy-budget consumption by checking whether previously released results can approximate the new query result. If it passes, an approximation is returned, avoiding the calculation of the new perturbed result (which consumes more of the privacy budget).
Adversary model
The ultimate goal of adversaries is to degrade privacy, meaning to re-identify data subjects in a targeted dataset. To this aim, we assume that two types of adversarial activities can be carried out.
First, we assume that adversaries can access all perturbed query results and are able to launch different types of privacy attacks based on their observations of those query results to re-identify data subjects. Because our approach satisfies the ε0-differential privacy, privacy is guaranteed.
Second, we assume that adversaries are interested in tampering with the privacy budget, such as altering, deleting, and making it unavailable so that perturbation will not be properly applied on the protecting dataset. Because the privacy budget is managed exclusively on the blockchain, it is guaranteed that the adversary will not be able to compromise such a decentralized structure to tamper with the anonymization process.
System Architecture
To implement the proposed approach, we propose a generic system architecture for blockchainbased data sharing. Specifically, an anonymization interface (AI) is realized to integrate a pluggable differential-privacy component with blockchain smart contracts.
As illustrated in Figure 3 , federated datasets and anonymization services (denoted as ANM) are integrated through AIs, which act as mediators with blockchain smart contracts, realizing the control flow in Figure 2 that was previously described. Data consumers interact with any AI to query datasets. Then, blockchain smart contracts execute the test activities to ensure privacy protection.
Data owners federating their sensitive datasets to a cloud federation can then trust third-party anonymization services due to the principled exploitation of blockchain smart contracts. They store and evaluate sharing history, while enforcing utility and data-privacy requirements. Nonrepudiable evidences of privacy-budget consumption and released query results enhance the security guarantees on privacy-preserving data-sharing processes. In particular, blockchain smart contracts carry out the secure management of the privacy budget and carry out the test activities. The third-party anonymization services only execute when there is no previously released result that can be used. This prevents attacks of altering or deleting budget consumptions, as well as improves the availability of anonymization services. 
EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
We prototyped our blockchain-based data-sharing approach using the Hyperledger Fabric smart contract blockchain and a traditional implementation of differential privacy using the Laplace mechanism. A real-world dataset from the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance is used, which contains employees' salary information (similar to Table 1 ). Our implementation is in Hyperledger Fabric V0.6 on a 2.6-GHz four-core Intel Xeon laptop running Ubuntu 14.04.5.
The experiments aim at evaluating, on the one hand, privacy and data-utility guarantees and, on the other hand, blockchain practicality. Specifically, there are four query function types (sum, average, max, and min), the privacy requirement ε0 is set to 10, and the data-utility requirement u to 1,500. The requested budget ε for each query is fixed at 0.5. Queries are simulated continuously and randomly by uniformly choosing a query type from those four. The compared baseline approach is the standard differential-privacy mechanism that generates randomized noise independently for each query.
Privacy
As proved in the description of our approach, our mechanism always provides ε0-differential privacy. That is, as the consumed privacy budget does not exceed ε0, the pre-defined privacy requirement is always satisfied. In this experiment, we focus on how the budget is consumed over queries. Figure 4 shows the budget consumption when our approach and the baseline approach are implemented. It is clear that the remaining budget decreases linearly in the baseline approach, so that the budget is used up after 20 queries. The remaining budget in our approach decreases more slowly than in the baseline approach. Specifically, for the first query, it drops the same in both approaches, as there has been no sharing history and no result can be approximated. From the second query, the decrease slows down as historical sharing results become available for approximation at some queries. More specifically, after receiving six queries, the historical sharing tuple stored in the blockchain becomes where all four query types have been received and stored for future approximation.
We now change the number of query types from four to two (max and average), representing the situation in which two query types are allowed. The consumption of the privacy budget is plotted together with the situation of four query types. Indeed, the fewer query types, the less the budget is consumed; it is more likely that historical sharing results can be used to approximate new results. Therefore, our approach is able to allow more queries to be executed and is more effective when there are fewer query types. . Budget consumption as the number of queries increases, where "two query types" means that just max and average queries are allowed, while "four query types" also includes min and sum queries.
Data Utility
Our approach introduces less noise compared with the baseline approach after receiving more queries, as the approximation test takes into account the utility requirement, guaranteeing that the amount of generated noise is bounded by u = 1,500. We compute the mean of the absolute noise over 20 queries and found 43,331.823 for the baseline approach, 3,864.97 for our approach with four query types, and 3,806.47 for our approach with two query types. Therefore, our approach provides slightly better data utility, and the number of query types does not affect the data utility.
Blockchain Practicality Storage capacity
As the data-sharing history stored on each block is only the latest released result, rather than a full list of release results, the size of the tuple that gathers such sharing history is suitably small and can be optimized by grouping by query type. Tuples can be illustrated as (DsetId, εr, [(qry1, res1), (qry2, res2)]) if two query types are allowed. Therefore, the design of the history tuple is light and suitable for blockchain storage, as demonstrated by the extensive tests.
Blockchain performance
The performance of smart-contract computation is shown in Figure 5 (a) when the number of stored query types changes from two to four, and then to eight. The computation on Hyperledger Fabric is very efficient, as the maximum time is 0.09 seconds. There is a slight increase in time when the size of the sharing history tuple increases. As the number of peers deployed in the Hyperledger blockchain increases, the computation time increases. This is because it takes more time to allow all peers to confirm the computation result (adding a new block). We now simulate more query requests at a single timestamp, particularly from 20 to 200 and 2,000 requests. As shown in Figure 5 (b), the time increases and the maximum time becomes 90 seconds when there are 2,000 requests received at the same time. Therefore, implementing our approach in Hyperledger Fabric offers good performance, and it is able to handle a great number of requests.
Permissioned blockchain
Our prototype implementation relies on Hyperledger Fabric, which enables us to deploy a private blockchain with control on operating users. Data owners are the default users who are allowed to access the blockchain but only manage the anonymization process of their own datasets. Additional access rules can be negotiated with data owners supported by the function of the smart contract. 
RELATED WORK
A considerable body of research has been devoted to addressing the data-privacy issues in cloud computing. Because of the openness and multi-tenant characteristic of the cloud, traditional privacy-preserving approaches (such as anonymization techniques 9 ) on their own cannot ensure the protection of personal data. Cryptographic approaches have been proposed to encrypt data before uploading to the cloud, 10, 11 and data can only be decrypted by authorized data consumers. These approaches rely on novel access control models to support various access requests from federated clouds. 12 To equip data owners with more control and accountability over data protection, blockchainbased proposals utilize blockchain to store data and control data sharing as a data-management platform. 13, 14 More specifically, Enigma, 13 a peer-to-peer network, supports different parties to jointly store and run computations on data while guaranteeing data privacy. This proposal combines blockchain with multi-party computation techniques and examines a mobile application data-sharing scenario. The other proposals, such as Ekblaw et al., 14 aim to protect patient health records and ensure the immutable, quick access to and confidential properties of such data storage. While these approaches focus on storing sensitive data directly on blockchain, our solution stores the process of anonymization services, which provides a stronger data-privacy guarantee and requires only light configuration for implementing our solution in a cloud federation.
CONCLUSION
Our blockchain-based data-sharing approach allows data owners to control the privacy protection of their datasets while enjoying the anonymization services provided in a cloud federation. Future work should include examining practical deployment issues in a cloud federation, integrating with security components (such as access control), and developing an effective user interface to support the control of the anonymization services.
